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Abstract
Despite these words of the state Supreme Court, Florida courts have
not expressly held that a divorced parent, with the financial ability to
do so, is required to provide his child with a college education.
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Post-Majority Support In Florida:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come?
In this age of sophisticated technology and economic complexity with the
necessity of development of special skills to qualify for pursuit of a trade,
profession or to obtain employment, a person over 18 and less than 21
may indeed be dependent on the help of others to obtain what education
and training is needed to be competitive in the economic system in which
he must make his way.'
Despite these words of the state Supreme Court, Florida courts have
not expressly held that a divorced parent, with the financial ability to
do so, is required to provide his child with a college education.2 Gener-
ally, the obligation of a parent to support a child ceases when the child
reaches majority.' The issue of support to provide college funds became
pertinent in Florida in 1973 when the age of majority was lowered
from twenty-one to eighteen." Prior to that time most children were
close to completion of a college education when they reached majority
and the question of support-during college was seldom raised.5
Although Florida does not yet recognize a duty of support beyond
the age of majority, recent decisions indicate that the courts are not
totally opposed to the idea of requiring a divorced parent to provide
1. Finn v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726, 731 (Fla. 1975).
2. In Finn, the court recognized the importance of education in dictum. See notes
7-9 & 22-24 infra and accompanying text.
3. Perla v. Perla, 58 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 1952).
4. FLA. STAT. § 1.01(14) (1979) states: "the word 'minor' includes any person
who has not attained the age of 18 years." FLA. STAT. § 743.07(1)(1979) provides:
The disability of nonage is hereby removed for all persons in this state who are
18 years of age or older, and they shall enjoy and suffer the rights, privileges and
obligations of all persons 21 years of age or older except as otherwise excluded
by the state constitution immediately preceding the effective date of this section.
These sections were created by Ch. 73-21, 1973 Fla. Laws 59, effective July 1, 1973.
5. See generally Nicolay v. Nicolay, 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
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funds for a child's college education. This note will examine Florida
cases dealing with this issue, and will explore the ramifications of a
finding of a duty of post-majority support, including the possibility of
an equal protection challenge, by examining decisions of other states
whose courts have ordered divorced parents to provide support beyond
majority for educational purposes.
I. FLORIDA DECISIONS
A. Pre-Existing Support Obligations
Florida Statute § 743.07, which removes the disability of nonage
for persons who are eighteen years of age or older, operates prospec-
tively rather than retrospectively.' In Finn v. Finn,' the Supreme Court
held that a final judgment in a dissolution proceeding rendered prior to
July 1, 1973, the effective date of section 743.07, was not affected by
the statute. The 1971 judgment, in addition to granting dissolution of
the marriage of the parties and awarding custody of the adoptive chil-
dren to the mother, ordered the father to pay weekly child support
The Court rejected the father's contention that section 743.07, by oper-
ation of law, modified the duration of the child support ordered so as to
terminate it when the children reached eighteen, and held that the final
judgment, rendered when the age of majority was twenty-one, had im-
pliedly set the duration of legal dependency to extend until the children
reached twenty-one."
The District Courts of Appeal have adhered to the view that judg-
ments for support entered prior to the effective date of the statute low-
ering the age of majority, and which provide for support to "majority,"
6. FLA. STAT. § 743.07(3) (1979) provides "[t]his section shall operate prospec-
tively and not retrospectively and shall not affect the rights and obligations existing
prior to July 1, 1973."
7. 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
8. The court in a dissolution proceeding has authority to order child support per
FLA. STAT. § 61.13(1) (1979) which provides in part that "[i]n a proceeding for disso-
lution of marriage, the court may at any time order either or both parents owing a duty
of support to a child of the marriage to pay such support as from the circumstances of
the parties and the nature of the case is equitable."
9. 312 So. 2d at 729. See also Daugherty v. Daugherty, 308 So. 2d 24 (Fla.
1975).
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"until emancipation," or "until age twenty-one," are binding and en-
forceable. The new age of majority does not affect the duration of sup-
port payments ordered by such judgments.10
B. Agreements to Provide Post-Majority Support
In spite of the general rule that a parent does not owe support to
children after they reach majority, specific agreements to support chil-
dren beyond majority or through college will be enforced., A father
who has agreed to pay for a child's college education under the terms
of a separation agreement will be required to pay for these educational
benefits regardless of the statutory age of majority. The court will not
remake an agreement. 2 A wife, as custodial parent and a contracting
party, has standing to seek enforcement of such an agreement. 8
C. What is a "Dependent Person?"
Although the age of majority, and consequently the duration of
the parental obligation of support, has been lowered to eighteen. Flor-
ida Statute § 743.07(2) provides that a court may require support for a
dependent person beyond the age of eighteen years.1 4 Much litigation
10. Burgdorf v. Burgdorf, 372 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Hoff-
man v. Hoffman, 371 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979). Manganiello v. Man-
ganiello, 359 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Swallick v. Swallick, 351 So. 2d
1119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). Drotos v. Drotos, 311 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975).
11. Holmes v. Holmes, 384 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Martinez
v. Martinez, 383 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). See also Veron, Parental
Support of Post-Majority Children in College: Changes and Challenges, 17 J. Fam. L.
645, 652-54 (1979).
12. Martinez, 383 So. 2d at 1155. See also Mohammed v. Mohammed, 371 So.
2d 1070 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (trial court's order of support, based on father's
offer to pay for his two children's college expenses for four years, affirmed).
13. Holmes, 384 So. 2d at 1296. Accord, Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So. 2d 278 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980). Dissolution court is the proper forum to enforce child support
payments for an adult child.*
14. FLA. STAT. § 743.07(2) (1979) states:
This section shall not prohibit any court of competent jurisdiction from requiring
support for a dependent person beyond the age of 18 years; and any crippled
child as defined in chapter 391 shall receive benefits under the provisions of said
chapter until age 21, the provisions of this section to the contrary notwithstand-
273 1
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has focused on the meaning of "dependent person" as used in the
statute.
It has long been recognized that a parent's support obligation may
continue after a child has reached majority when the child is, from
physical or mental deficiencies, unable to support himself.1" Depen-
dency in this sense has not been equated with incompetency. Evidence
that a child was able to hold a part-time job under close supervision
while attending a junior college, but was unable to be self-sustaining
because of his mental condition, has been held sufficient to uphold a
finding of dependency and requirement of support.16 Florida courts are
divided, however, as to whether a full-time student without physical or
mental disabilities may be a dependent person and therefore entitled to
support after reaching the age of eighteen, per §743.07(2).
In White v. White,17 a case decided shortly after the age of major-
ity was lowered to eighteen, the First District Court of Appeal reversed
an order of the trial judge which required a father to pay support for
his eighteen year old son who in the trial court's opinion was entitled to
a college education at the expense of his parents.18 The appeal court
postulated that the term "dependent person" in section 743.07 was in-
tended by the legislature to mean a person over eighteen years of age
unable by reason of physical or mental incompetency or inability to be
independent,1 9 and held that it was not empowered to require the fa-
ther to support his able-bodied son. In a dissent which was subse-
quently cited and approved by the state Supreme Court,20 Judge Mc-
Cord expressed the view that if the legislature intended to limit
dependent persons to disabled persons it would have done so, and that
the reasonable pursuit of an education is relevant to the question of
ing. (emphasis added).
15. Perla, 58 So. 2d at 690. Accord, Fincham v. Levin, 155 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Ist
Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (father ordered to support unmarried adult daughter who had
been an epileptic since birth and was mentally and physically unable to care for or
support herself). •
16. Fagan v. Fagan, 381 So. 2d 278 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
17. 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
18. Id. at 621.
19. Id. at 623.
20. Finn, 312 So. 2d at 731.
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dependency.21
The Supreme Court of Florida, in Finn v. Finn2 2 stated in dic-
tum 23 that the interpretation of "dependent person" as one who is de-
pendent because of physical or mental incompetence or inability is too
narrow24 and that one pursuing an education in good faith with a need
for help beyond his own reasonable capacity to provide for himself may
be a dependent person. 5 Nevertheless, the District Courts of Appeal
have held that "the mere fact that a person is attending a university or
college does not render him or her dependent" 26 and they have failed to
hold that financial inability to support oneself while pursuing a college
education may constitute dependency within the meaning of the
statute.
D. No Support Beyond Age Twenty-One
While the supreme court's dicta in Finn indicates that a student
without physical or mental disabilities may nevertheless be dependent,
and therefore entitled to parental support beyond the age of eighteen, it
also implies that dependency in this situation ends at age twenty-one.2
Shortly after Finn was decided, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
reversed that portion of a marriage dissolution judgment which ordered
the husband to pay the college tuition of the parties' twenty-three year
old son. The court recognized Finn's apparent holding that dependency
as a result of the bona fide pursuit of education may exist as to one
between eighteen and twenty-one years of age, but did not interpret
either section 743.07 or Finn "as authorizing a court to require a par-
ent to support a child over twenty-one years of age, whether for educa-
21. 296 So. 2d at 625.
22. 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
23. The holding, enforcing a judgment ordering child support until the parties'
children reached age twenty-one, was based on the fact that the judgment was ren-
dered prior to the effective date of § 743.07. See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying
text.
24. 312 So. 2d at 731.
25. Id. at 730.
26. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74, 75 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Accord,
Genoe v. Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); French v. French, 303
So. 2d 668 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
27. See note I supra and accompanying text.
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tional purposes or otherwise, unless the child is dependent as a result of
physical or mental deficiencies." 28
Other Florida courts are in agreement that orders of support for
education beyond the age of twenty-one are not justified.29 In a recent
case, the Second District Court of Appeal commented "that while the
legislature in lowering the age of majority to eighteen did not intend to
eliminate any requirement for parents to pay their children's way
through college, there is nothing to indicate that the legislature wished
to enlarge parental obligations."30
E. Is There A Duty to Educate Adult Children?
Florida courts have based their refusal to order support to healthy
children beyond the age of eighteen on the general rule that the obliga-
tion of parental support ends at majority,3 1 and on the holding that
attendance at college does not necessarily make a person "dependent,"
within the meaning of Florida Statute § 743.07.32 In 1978, the Fourth
District Court of Appeal went a step further by declaring that a parent
does not owe a duty to an adult child to provide a college education. 33
Although recognizing that a full-time college student in active and sin-
cere pursuit of an education may be dependent upon his parents for
support, the court reversed a lower court order requiring a father to
provide a college education for his adult child upon a finding of no
28. Briggs v. Briggs, 312 So. 2d 762, 762 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
29. Watterson v. Watterson, 353 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Winikoff v. Winikoff, 339 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
30. Nicolay v. Nicolay, 387 So. 2d 500, 505-06 n.5 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1980). See notes 40-43 infra and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Genoe v. Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Rollings v. Rollings, 362 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Krogen v. Krogen,
320 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Kowalski v. Kowalski, 315 So. 2d 497
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also Cyr v. Cyr, 354 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Baldi v. Baldi, 323 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (holding the
trial court was without authority to order child support beyond age of eighteen years
and that question of support as dependent children should be determined by the court,
if requested, at the time of the attainment of majority of each child).
32. See Dwyer v. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d 74 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Genoe v.
Genoe, 373 So. 2d 940 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979); French v. French, 303 So. 2d
668 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
33. Kern v. Kern, 360 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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legally enforceable obligation. 4 The court noted that Florida Statutes
§§ 61.13 35 and 743.0736 must be read together and that before a court
may order support for an adult child, "it must find (1) that the parent
owes a duty of support, and (2) that the child is dependent upon that
parent for such support. ' 7
While parents have a duty to educate minor children, 38 no such
duty has been recognized as to children beyond the age of majority.
Providing a college education for children may be a moral obligation of
some parents, but it is not presently recognized as a legal one. 9
F. Indirect Provision for Post-Majority Support
The Second District Court of Appeal in a 1980 decision, Nicolay
v. Nicolay,'° gave the first inkling that Florida is willing to recognize a
child's needs for higher education by affirming an order of increased
alimony to a mother for the sole purpose of allowing her to furnish her
daughters with a college education.41 After reviewing the decisions of
all the district courts. of appeal regarding post-majority support, as well
as the supreme court's decision in Finn v. Finn, the court stated its
34. The court also held that even if a duty of support for an adult child does
exist, a dissolution proceeding is not the proper forum in which to establish the exis-
tence of that obligation. Id. at 485. This case should be distinguished from those involv-
ing an agreement to support an adult child. A dissolution proceeding is the proper
forum in which to seek enforcement of an agreement. See note 13 supra and accompa-
nying text.
35. See note 8 supra for text of statute.
36. See note 14 supra for text of relevant portion of statute.
37. 360 So. 2d at 484.
38. FLA. STAT. § 744.361 (1979) provides in part: "(1) It is the duty of the
guardian of the person to take care of the person of the ward, to treat him humanely,
and, if he is a minor, to see that he is properly educated and that he has the opportu-
nity to learn a trade, occupation or possession." (emphasis added).
39. Kern, 360 So. 2d at 485. French v. French, 303 So. 2d 668, 669 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1974). See generally Washburn, Post-Majority Support: Oh Dad, Poor
Dad, 44 Temple L.Q. 319, 325-29 (1971).
40. 387 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
41. The upward adjustment in alimony was ordered to help Mrs. Nicolay main-
tain the standard to which she was accustomed while married. The standard, according
to the court, "was such that she could rightfully expect to be able to provide her chil-
dren with a college education, particularly since they were exceptionally bright and
hence were outstanding candidates for college." Id. at 506.
277 I1
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belief that the legislature, in lowering the age of majority, did not in-
tend to deprive worthy children of the funds needed to attend college.42
Since the appeal was based on alimony rather than child support, the
court was not required to overrule any prior decisions. However, they
stated that if the case had been an appeal from an order raising child
support, they would have been "inclined to hold that in a dissolution
proceeding a court could find a child under the age of twenty-one de-
pendent by reason of attendance at college and order one or both of his
parents to provide support" since "there is no fixed rule forbidding an
order of increased child support to finance a child's college education
up to the age of twenty-one."' 43
It remains to be seen whether Florida's courts will expand upon
the logic of the Second District Court of Appeal's decision and find
full-time college students dependent and therefore entitled to parental
support beyond the present age of majority. The remainder of this note
will deal with the possible consequences of such a finding.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGE
As support for their refusal to order post-majority support to
finance a child's education, Florida courts have noted that since off-
spring of married parents do not have a legal right to parental support
while attending college, children of divorced parents should not have
this right." As Judge Boyer of the First District Court of Appeal
phrased it, "[t]he fact that domestic whirlwinds cause a severance of
the marriage does not enhance the rights of the children nor alter the
obligations of the parents.' 4 5
In Kern v. Kern, the court recognized the potential equal protec-
tion problem in noting that the state would have no reasonable grounds
to treat the adult children of divorced parents any differently than the
adult children of married parents.4' This rationale, however, overlooks
the fact that children whose parents are still married often continue to
receive support beyond the age of majority and therefore have an ad-
42. Id. at 505.
43. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis supplied by the court).
44. Dwyer, 327 So. 2d at 75; White, 296 So. 2d at 623.
45. 296 So.2d at 623.
46. 360 So. 2d at 485.
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vantage over children of divorced parents.'7
Under an equal protection challenge, the rational relationship test
is applied to a statutory classification and, if shown to be rationally
related to some legitimate government interest, the statute is upheld.4
8
State statutes which specifically permit courts to order support for
adult children who are pursuing an education have withstood equal
protection attacks.
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in In re Marriage of Vrban, ' noted
the state's recognition of the increasing importance of education, as evi-
denced by ever-increasing appropriations for educational purposes, and
concluded that higher education was a matter of legitimate state inter-
est.50 Next, the court found that the state statute51 allowing a trial
court to order a divorced parent to pay support for an adult child who
is a full-time student bore a rational relationship to the state interest.
In making this determination, the court took note of the differences in
circumstances between married and divorced parents. 2
Similarly, in Kujawinski v. Kujawinski,5 3 the- Illinois Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute which permits a
court in a dissolution proceeding to order post-majority support to chil-
47. Washburn, supra note 39, at 329 n.55.
48. Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978). For a complete
discussion of post-majority support and equal protection, see Veron, supra note 11, at
668-78.
49. 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980).
50. Id. at 202.
51. IOWA CODE § 598.1(2) (1977) provides in part:
"Support" or "support payments" means any amount which the court may re-
quire either of the parties to pay under a temporary order or a final judgment or
decree, and may include . . . child support . . . and any other term used to
describe such obligations. Such obligations may include support for a child who
is between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two years who is regularly attending
an approved school . . ., or is, in good faith, a full-time student in a college,
university, or area school; or has been accepted for admission to a college. . .; or
a child of any age who is dependent on the parties to the dissolution proceeding
because of physical or mental disability.
52. 293 N.W.2d at 202. The court noted that married parents usually support
their children through college years while divorced parents, when deprived of custody,
sometimes react by refusing support. See also Harris v. Harris, 585 P.2d 435 (Utah
1978).
53. 71 11. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
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dren for educational purposes, by finding that "the imposition of such
an obligation upon divorced parents is reasonably related to a legiti-
mate legislative purpose." '54 The court noted the major economic and
personal impact of divorce on the lives of those involved, including the
fact that divorced parents are often unwilling to voluntarily provide
support to the same extent as married parents.55
In a frequently cited case on the issue of post-majority support,
Childers v. Childers,5 the Supreme Court of Washington held that re-
quiring a divorced parent, under certain circumstances, 57 to support a
child beyond the age of majority while a college education is pursued,
is not violative of equal protection. Like Florida, Washington does not
have a statute specifically empowering a court to order support for edu-
cation of an adult child, but does allow a court to order support to a
dependent child to whom a duty of support is owed.58
In Childers, the court defined dependent in this context as "one
who looks to another for support and maintenance, one who is in fact
dependent, [or] one who relies on another for the reasonable necessities
of life,"59 and held that this definition encompassed full-time college
students. In support of their finding of a duty of post-majority support
for higher education, the court cited earlier cases which found a duty to
educate minor children, and to provide a college education if the parent
would suffer no significant hardship and the child showed aptitude. The
duty was based in part on the court's recognition of the state's public
policy that a college education should be had, as evidenced by the
maintenance of several institutions of higher learning at public ex-
54. Id. at _, 376 N.E.2d at 1389.
55. Id. at _, 376 N.E.2d at 1389-90.
56. 89 Wash. 2d 592, 575 P.2d 201 (1978). See also 17 J. FAM. L. 604 (1979).
57. The court stated that the factors to be considered before support is ordered
include the child's age, needs, prospects, desires, aptitudes, abilities, and disabilities,
and the parents' level of education, standard of living, and current and future re-
sources. A court should also consider the amount and type of support the child would
have been afforded had his parents remained married. 89 Wash. 2d at -, 575 P.2d at
205.
58. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.100 (1973) provides in part: "the court may order
either or both parents owing a duty of support to any child of the marriage dependent
upon either or both spouses to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support."
59. 89 Wash. 2d at - 575 P.2d at 205.
10
Nova Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 8
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol5/iss2/8
5:1981 Post-Majority Support In Florida 281
pense.60 Since the new statute used the term "dependent" rather than
"minor," the court reasoned that the parental duty to educate is no
longer limited by minority and that trial courts should now have discre-
tion to determine when a duty of support is owed, based on the facts
and circumstances of each case.61 The court then held that this inter-
pretation of the statute does not violate equal protection since it is ra-
tionally related to the legitimate governmental interest of minimizing
the disadvantages of children whose parents have divorced.
It appears that the establishment of a duty of post-majority sup-
port for education of offspring, whether done explicitly by enactment of
a new statute or through judicial interpretaton of an existing statute,
can withstand an equal protection challenge. Courts have recognized
the impact of divorce on children and the need for higher education in
today's society in upholding decisions ordering a divorced parent to
contribute toward the education of his adult child.
III. FACTORS WHEN ORDERING'SUPPORT
No court has held that the duty to support an adult child while he
is pursuing an education is absolute. The decision as to whether post-
majority support should be ordered, in those states which recognize the
allowance of such an order, is within the sound discretion of the trial
court.62 Several factors must be considered, including the parent's abil-
ity to pay, the child's aptitude and willingness to further his education,
and whether the child would have received the education if the mar-
riage had not been dissolved. 3 In addition, courts have recognized the
60. Id. at -, 575 P.2d at 206. See also Marriage of Eusterman, 41 Or. App. 717,
598 P.2d 1274 (1979).
61. 89 Wash. 2d at ., 575 P.2d at 204, 207.
62. See, Nicholls v. Nicholls, 33 Conn. Supp. 210, 371 A.2d 400 (Super. Ct.
1977); Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 111. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978); In re Mar-
riage of Vrban, 293 N.W.2d 198 (Iowa 1980); Childers v. Childers, 89 Wash. 2d 592,
575 P.2d 201 (1978).
63. See, e.g., Nicholls v. Nicholls, 33 Conn. Supp. 210, 371 A.2d 400 (Super. Ct.
1977); Khalaf v. Khaiaf, 58 N.J. 63, 275 A.2d 132 (1971); Ross v. Ross, 167 N.J.
Super. 441, 400 A.2d 1233 (1979) (father ordered to continue support payments until
daughter completed law school); Commonwealth ex rel. Ulmer v. Sommerville, 200 Pa.
Super. 640, 190 A.2d 182 (1963); In re Marriage of Campbell, 22 Wash. App. 560,
589 P.2d 1244 (1978). See generally Washburn, supra note 39, at 326-27.
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increasing importance of higher education:
[W]e are living today in an age of keen competition, and if the children
of today who are to be the citizens of tomorrow are to take their rightful
place in a complex order of society and government, and discharge the
duties of citizenship as well as meet with success the responsibilities de-
volving upon them in their relations with their fellow man, the church,
the state and nation, it must be recognized that their parents owe them
the duty to the extent of their financial capacity to provide for them the
training and education which will be of such benefit to them in the dis-
charge of the responsibilities of citizenship. It is a duty which the parent
not only owes to his child, but to the state as well, since the stability of
our government must depend upon a well-equipped, a well-trained, and a
well-educated citizenship."
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida has not definitively ruled on the
issue of post-majority support for education. The district courts of ap-
peal are divided in their views as to whether a court should order a
divorced parent, in the absence of a specific agreement, to provide sup-
port to an adult child for college expenses. Florida Statute § 743.07
empowers a court to order support to a dependent person beyond the
age of eighteen years, but no court has based an order of support on
the finding that a full-time college student is dependent.
Other states have recognized the special needs of children whose
parents have divorced and the increasing importance of education, by
imposing, under certain circumstances, a duty on divorced parents who
can afford it, to support their children through college. The statutes
establishing this duty have withstood equal protection challenges.
Florida courts have recognized that an adult college student may
be dependent upon others for support. Perhaps they will soon acknowl-
edge the growing trend toward providing post-majority support to chil-
dren of divorced parents to enable them to obtain an education and
64. Pass v. Pass, 238 Miss. 449, 458, 118 So. 2d 769, 773 (1960). See also Finn
v. Finn, 312 So. 2d 726 (Fla. 1975).
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overcome the disadvantage they presently suffer in relation to their
peers with married parents.
Barbara B. Wagner
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